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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
the child to him, and the question presented was which court had
jurisdiction of the child. The Supreme Court said: "When the superior
court33 found the relator was a fit and proper person to have the custody
of her, at that moment the child ceased to be a dependent or delinquent
person, for whose protection the juvenile law was enacted."', This is
a square holding on the direct issue of jurisdiction between the two
courts. It cannot be presumed that the dicta in the principal case will
overrule the Marmo holding.
ALICE D. HUBBARD
Grounds for Divorce-Insanity. In Wolfe v. Wolfe, 42 Wn.2d 834, 258 P.2d 1211
(1953), an action for divorce brought on the grounds of cruelty, the husband was
granted a divorce by the trial court. The case was appealed by the wife (represented
by her guardian ad litem), who, according to the evidence introduced at the trial, had
been insane for more than two years preceding the commencement of the action. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that under RCW 26.08.020(10), where a party to a
divorce action has been suffering from chronic mania for a period of more than two
years prior to the beginning of the action, such insanity shall be the sole and exclusive
ground upon which the court may grant a divorce, and that this statute is a defense
to an action for divorce upon any other statutory grounds. This is the first case decided
under this section of the Divorce Act of 1949, and is a literal application of the statute.
EVIDENCE
Witnesses-Competency of Insane Person. The court in State v.
Moorison' affirmed the trial court's ruling that a person was a compe-
tent witness even though previously adjudicated insane by a Colorado
court. The precise question had not previously been before the court.'
The relevant Washington statute3 excluding persons of unsound mind
is merely declaratory of the common law. The present generally recog-
nized common law interpretation is that an insane person is competent
to testify if at the time of his presentation as a witness he understands
the nature of an oath and is capable of giving a correct account of
what he has seen and heard.' Dicta in the instant case indicated that
competency also depends on mental capacity at the time of the events
concerning which the witness is to testify.
The court further stated that competency is a matter within the
discretion of the trial court to be determined by the use of a voir dire
33 Reference is to Superior Court of Spokane County in which divorce proceedings
and subsequent modification of divorce decree were had.
34 Supra note 9, at 158, 196 Pac. at 578.
1 143 Wash. Dec. 21, 259 P.2d 1105 (1953).
2 Cf. State v. Hardung, 161 Wash. 379, 297 Pac. 167 (1931) ; Summerlin v. Depart-
ment of Labor and Industries, 8 Wn.2d 43, 111 P.2d 603 (1941) (guardian appointed).
3 RCW 5.60.050.
4 District of Columbia v. Ames, 107 U.S. 519 (1883).
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hearing which may be aided by extrinsic evidence.
The adjudication of the witness as insane creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the witness is incompetent. The offering party has the
burden of proving competency. This is the opposite of the situation
in which there is no adjudication of insanity, the burden of showing
incompetency being on him who objects on that ground.
Relevancy-Fact of Arrest in Civil Suits. In a subsequent civil
action a traffic citation is inadmissible for the purpose of proving any
fact in connection with an accident or to impeach a witness by showing
a previous act of misconduct. This was the rule announced in Billing-
ton v. Schaal,' which expressly overruled Segerstrom v. Lawrence.' In
the Billington' case the plaintiff offered to prove by the testimony of the
arresting officer that the defendant was following the plaintiff's car too
closely. The court said that mere arrest was quite consistent with inno-
cence, and even if the defendant had been convicted-except on a plea
of guilty-the conviction could not be used to prove the fact that the
defendant was following too closely. The reason given was that it
would be opinion testimony on a matter not requiring expert knowledge.
It should be noted that in this case the arresting officer did not arrive
until after the accident occurred. The case relied on by the Washington
court was Fitch v. Bemis.8 Dicta in the Fitch case indicated the Ver-
mont court would hold such arrest admissible if the arresting officer
were an eye-witness to the accident. However, dicta in the instant case
indicated the Washington court would be reluctant to follow Vermont
to this extent, stating that the fact of arrest is inadmissible as evidence
of an on-the-spot opinion of the officer as to the defendant's negligence.
The court stated the rule to be that an opinion may not be given where
no expert knowledge is required or where it involves the very issue
presented to the jury. It is submitted that the court would admit the
testimony of the arresting officer in either case as to what he saw, but
not as to the ultimate fact of negligence itself.
Criminal Record of Plaintiff-Admissibility to Limit Claim to
Damages for Unemployment. In Minch v. Local Union No. 370,
I. U. 0. E.,9 it was held that the trial court erred in denying the de-
542 Wn.2d 878, 259 P.2d 634 (1953).
a64 Wash. 245, 116 Pac. 876 (1911).
7 Billington v. Schaal, supra note 5.
a 107 Vt. 165, 177 Atl. 193 (1935).9 144 Wash. Dec. 14, 265 P.2d 286 (1953).
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fendant the right to prove the plaintiff's criminal record for the purpose
of limiting his claim to damages for unemployment. The plaintiff was
a power-shovel operator and the main source of work in the area was
the atomic bomb project at Hanford. Before one could work there he
had to obtain security clearance from the F. B. I. If the criminal record
of the plaintiff had been known to the F. B. I. he might have been
denied work on the project.
The court stated that the lack of authority in this type of case stems
from the fact that the situation presented is unique. There are, of
course, many situations where a part of the damages claimed is loss
of wages, e.g., actions for personal injuries or wrongful death. In Hill v.
Erie R. Co.,'" an action by the next of kin for loss of support from a
minor child, the court held that proof of the juvenile court record of
the plaintiff's decedent was inadmissible. The reason given was that
a juvenile court adjudication could have no probative effect, not that a
criminal conviction would have no bearing on future earnings. The
reason the New York court gave for the lack of probative effect was
that a juvenile court adjudication could not denominate the child as a
criminal, likening such adjudication to parental chastisement. This
case leaves the inference that a criminal conviction would have bearing
on future earnings and would be admissible for such purpose."
The Washington court, however, in the instant case stood squarely
on the proposition that the criminal record of the plaintiff is important
where security clearance by the F. B. I. is a condition precedent to the
plaintiff's obtaining work.
It is submitted that the court would not be willing to extend the
holding beyond the fact situation here presented.12 However, by a
combination of the instant case and Hill v. Erie R. Co. 3 it is possible
to arrive at the conclusion that proof of the injured party's or the
decedent's criminal conviction should be admissible when an element
of damages is loss of wages. All that would be necessary would be
factual proof or judicial notice of facts leading to the conclusion that
ex-convicts don't obtain employment as readily as others, and then
the prior convictions would be admissible.
10225 App. Div. 19, 232 N.Y. Supp. 66 (1928).
11 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 211 (3d ed. 1940).
12"We cannot see how the problem will arise frequently in the future." Minch v.
Local Union No. 370, I. U. 0. E., supra note 9 at 24, 265 P.2d at 292.
13 Supra note 10.
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Witnesses-Competency-Interested Party-Time at Which In.
terest Is to Be Determined In Adams Marine Service, Inc. v. Fishel",
the plaintiff company sued for specific performance of an alleged oral
contract for the sale of land. The, defendant was the executrix and
widow of the deceased vendor. Invoking the "dead man" statute"5 the
defendant challenged the "competency of the witness to testify, stating
the witness was president of and had owned stock in the plaintiff
,'ompany at the time of the commencement of the action and was.
therefore, an "interested party." The trial court found the witness to
be competent since he had made a bona fide transfer of the stock and
had severed relations with the company before the time he testified.
The Supreme Court in affirming the decision emphasized the fact that
this was a bona fide transfer not made merely to qualify the witness.
The court adopted the rule that the interest of the witness is to be
determined at the date he testifies and not before. This erases any
inference to be drawn from Gilmnore v. H. W. Baker Co."6 to the effect
that the interest of the witness is to be determined at the time of the
transaction rather than at the time of testifying.
The contention was also made that the witness was a party in interest
because the outcome of the suit might have a bearing upon a subsequent
suit by the defendant against the witness for trespass. The court re-
jected this, and the test was stated to be whether the witness will gain
or lose by direct legal operation of a judgment of the court in the action
in which his competency is in issue.
In both of the questions presented it would seem that the court has
followed the purposes of the statute.
Relevancy-Fact of No Insurance. In King v. Starr,"' an action for
personal injuries, the defendant's counsel in his opening statement said
that the defendant had no insurance. Objection to this was made and
sustained. The court instructed the jury to disregard that reference.
The plaintiff made a motion for a mistrial which was denied. The
Supreme Court reversed the denial of the motion, thus complementing
the rule against deliberate injection of the subject of insurance into
the trial.
This is a case of first impression in Washington, the previous cases
being confined to the questions presented by the deliberate injection
1442 Wn.2d 555, 357 P.2d 203 (1953).
15 RCW 5.60.030.
1s 12 Wash. 468, 41 Pac. 124 (1895).
17 143 Wash. Dec. 105, 260 P.2d 351 (1953).
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by the plaintiff of the fact that the defendant did have insurance,", or
an inadvertent injection of such fact." The deciding factor remains
the manner of disclosure and not the disclosure itself. Deliberate in-
jection is a ground for a mistrial, whereas inadvertent injection is not.
The conduct of counsel decides the evidentiary matter of insurance
in this state, regardless of how prejudicial the inadvertent injection
may be.
SALLY CAMPBELL
Admission of Certified Copies of Foreign Divorce Decrees. In
Edlin v. Edlin,'° the court held that a divorce decree from a sister
state was admissible evidence in an action for arrearages in alimony
and child support payments, although the decree did not bear the
signature of any judge. Annexed to the decree was a certificate of the
clerk of the court of the sister state reciting that the instrument was a
full, true and complete copy of the divorce decree, together with a
certificate of a judge attesting the validity of the clerk's certificate.
This decision is consistent with Allard v. La Plain," in which it was
held that if the document from the sister state is authenticated as
required by federal statute, - its validity as admissible evidence cannot
be questioned. By reason of the full faith and credit clause, -3 it cannot
be presumed that the law of procedure in the sister state is the same
as that in Washington, which requires authentication by the signature
of the presiding judge."
JOAN SMITH
Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act-Liberal Construc-
tion. In Cantrill v. American Mail Line,21 the court held that under
RCW 5.44.110, hospital records were admissible in evidence to show
that some of the injuries complained of by the plaintiff in a negligence
action actually existed prior to the accident. The plaintiff's objection
18 Iverson v. McDonnell, 36 Wash. 73, 78 Pac. 202 (1904).
19 Williams v. Hofer, 30 Wn.2d 253, 191 P.2d 306 (1948).
20 42 Wn.2d 445, 256 P.2d 283 (1953).
21 147 Wash. 497, 266 Pac. 688 (1928).
22 "... The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such state, terri-
tory or possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within
the United States and its territories and possessions by the attestation of the clerk and
seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the
court that the said attestation is in proper form. . . ." 62 STAT. 947, 28 U.S.C.A. §
1738 (1948).
23 U.S. CONST. ART. IV, § 1.
24 RCW 4.64.010.
2542 Wn.2d 590, 257 P2d 179 (1953).
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that the entries were not shown by a witness with actual knowledge to
have been made in the usual course of business or at or near the time
that the act or event took place was considered to be without merit,2"
since the trial court was satisfied that sufficient testimony had been
adduced regarding the record's identity.17 "In this state the ruling of
the trial judge in admitting or excluding such records is given much
weight and will not be reversed unless there has been a manifest abuse
of discretion." The court affirmed that the person who has actually
created the record need not be, examined as to the record's identity
and the mode of its preparation "so long as it is produced by one who
has the custody of the record as a regular part of his work or has
supervision of its creation."" s
In Cerkonek v. Dibble," the court did not disturb the trial court's
refusal to admit a form listing card reciting that a specified number
of acres of land sold to the plaintiffs were irrigated, since there was
no evidence by a qualified witness that the card was part of the office
records of the realtor who took the listing, and no explanation of where
the card came from.
In State v. Emmanuel,s0 the defendant complained that a pencil
notation on the business record was "self-serving and prejudicial"
inasmuch as other notations made in the course of business were in ink.
The court summarily dismissed this contention. "This objection might
affect the reliability of the check register as a business record but the
26 The court cited Gallagher v. Portland Traction Co., 181 Ore. 385, 182 P2d 354
(1947), where hospital records covering a fifteen year period were admitted.
27 As to the requirement of identification of business records generally, see 21 ALR
2d 773 (1952), (Verification and authentication of slips, tickets, bills, invoices, etc.,
made in regular course of business under Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act,
or under similar "Model Acts"). There are a few Washington cases illustrating some
of the records which are admissible when properly identified: Choate v. Robertson,
31 Wn.2d 118, 195 P.2d 630 (1948) (county hospital records) ; Witenberg v. Sylvia,
35 Wn.2d 626, 214 P2d 690 (1950) (ledger sheet in an action on a check) ; Griffith v.
Whittier, 27 Wn.2d 351, 223 P2d 1062 (1950) (notations on personal desk calendar
not admissible) ; State v. Meyer, 37 Wn.2d 759, 226 P.2d 204 (1951) (clinical record
of interview with patient) ; Morrison v. Nelson, 38 Wn.2d 649, 231 P.2d 336 (1951)
(minute books, journal and ledger of corporation).
28 Many courts, in absence of statute, extended the common-law "regular entries"
exception to the hearsay rule to cover hospital records. E.g., Gearhart v. Des Moines
Ry., 237 Iowa 213, 21 N.W.2d 569 (1946). But their admittance was restricted by the
requirement of the rule excluding them when the original entrant was not produced
or accounted for. 5 WGoitoE, EVIDENcE § 1530 (3d ed. 1940). The purpose of the
business records act, in this respect, was "to avoid the necessity and thereby the ex-
pense, inconvenience and sometimes the impossibility of calling as witnesses the
attendants, nurses and physicians who have collaborated to make the hospital record of
a patient." Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1947), and cases cited
therein.
2o 42 Wn.2d 451, 256 P.2d 488 (1953).
so 42 Wn.2d 799, 259 P.2d 845 (1953).
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statute referred to gives the trial judge a discretion as to the admissi-
bility of such records.. . .We cannot find any abuse of discretion in
admitting them." 3
These cases, taken together, illustrate a reluctance to tamper with
the trial court's discretion in application of the Uniform Business
Records Act. This would seem to indicate a desirable tendency toward
liberal interpretation of the statute. Many courts32 have not been so
lenient in their interpretation. This perhaps is understandable in view
of the tradition observed by one writer that "transgressors tread no
harder way than do those who seek to liberalize the law of evidence."3
At any rate, it is to be hoped that this trend of the Washington court
will continue so that the framers' intention to abrogate "all the defects
and needless fetters of the common-law business-entries rule"34 will
be given full effect.3
Attorney-Client Privilege-Communications in the Presence of
Two or More Interested Persons. In State v. Emmanuel," the court
held that where two defendants and their respective counsel meet to
discuss their procedure in defending a breach of contract action, and
where one defendant makes an oral statement in answer to a question
directed to him by the other defendant's attorney, such statement is
privileged, but the State is not a party who can claim the privilege.
The problem arose in an action charging the defendant with bribery.
A vital issue in the case was whether the payment by the prosecuting
witness to the defendant was taken by the defendant in settlement of
his claim for "a commission" in connection with sale of certain timber,
or was a bribe to induce the defendant, as secretary of the Board of
Land Commissioners, to extend the time within which the timber was
to be cut upon penalty of reversion to the State. In a previous con-
:o Similar statements have recurred in previous cases: Choate v. Robertson, supra
note 27; Witenberg v. Sylvia, supra note 27; State v. Meyer, supra note 27.32 Notably, the United States Supreme Court. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109,
63 Sup.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943).33 Note, 56 HAzv. L. REv. 458, 459 (1942). This is a comment on Hoffman v. Palmer,
129 F.2d 976 (C.A.2d 1942), which was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Note 32 supra.34 Norville, The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, 27 ORE. L. REv. 188(1948). This is a lengthy and exhaustive discussion of the impact of the Business
Records Act on the Shopbook and Regular Entries in Course of Business rules.
35 For a short comment as to "the final step taken by the legislature to free the
business man, the lawyer, and the courts from the archaic absurdities of the common
law rules of evidence relating to the proof of business and public records," see Richards,
The Uniform Photographic Copies of Business Records as Evidence Act, 28 WASH.
L. RIEv. 176 (1953).36 42 Wn.2d 799, 259 P.2d 845 (1953).
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tract action regarding the sale of the timber, the defendant and prose-
cuting witness were named as defendants. A meeting was held between
them and their respective counsel to discuss their course of action in
defending against this suit. In the present case, on cross-examination
of the prosecuting witness and on direct examination of the defendant
and of his then attorney, the defendant's counsel attempted to prove
an oral statement made by the prosecuting witness at this meeting in
answer to a question directed to him by the defendant's then attorney.
Each time counsel for the State objected on the ground that the com-
munication was privileged. The lower court sustained these objections.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that these were privileged com-
munications, but that the State could not claim the privilege. Judge
Finley concurred in the result, but denied that any such privilege
existed."
This case represents, in Washington, a somewhat further extension
of the attorney-client privilege under RCW 5.60.060(2). Specifically,
this extension relates to those rules which are applied to a communica-
tion made in the presence of two or more interested persons. The
statute is acknowledged to be declaratory of the common law privi-
lege.38 This, of course, requires resort to established case law.
A common law principle "universally conceded" is that when the
same attorney acts for two parties having a common interest, and each
party communicates with him, the communications are privileged from
disclosure at the instance of a third person." Similarly, where the
attorney represents only one of those present at a conference (though
87 Judge Finley, in this opinion, questions the value of the privilege generally as it
now exists, and suggests that "some reconsideration and qualification regarding the
rule may well be in order... ." Professor Wigmore, on the other hand, in his treatise
ably reviews the arguments and answers of the various exponents, and concludes that
the privilege "is well worth preserving for the sake of general policy." 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2291 (3d ed. 1940). The comprehensive treatment given the entire subject
by Professor Wigmore precludes any necessity for a review here. Radin, 77te Priilege
of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487
(1928), presents a brief and provocative inquiry into the background and justification
of the privilege.
38 Hartness v. Brown, 21 Wash. 655, 59 Pac. 491 (1899) ; Williams v. Blumenthal,
27 Wash. 24, 67 Pac. 693 (1901) ; Hurlburt v. Hurlburt, 128 N.Y. 420, 28 N.E. 651
(1891) ; Stone v. Minter, 111 Ga. 45, 36 S.E. 321 (1900) ; In re Young, 33 Utah 382,
94 Pac. 731 (1908).
80 8 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2312 (3d ed. 1940) ; E.g., Baldwin v. Commissioner, 125
F.2d 812, 141 ALR 548 (C.A.9th 1942). This privilage cannot be asserted, however,
in a suit between the parties since "as between themselves, their statements were not
intended to be confidential." Halffman v. Halffman, 113 Wash. 320, 194 Pac. 371
(1920); Billias v. Panageoton, 193 Wash. 523, 76 P.2d 987 (1938). Nor does the
privilege exist where the interests of the parties are opposed. Stone v. Minter, Tupra
note 38; Scott v. Aultman Co., 211 Ill. 612, 71 N.E. 1112 (1904) ; Allan v. Shiffman,
172 N.C. 578, 90 S.E. 577 (1916).
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all are interested parties), the matters discussed constitute privileged
communications as to strangers to the conference. The rule was estab-
lished in Hartness v. Brown," based on the court's contention that the
privilege rule "should be fairly construed so that the freest communica-
tion may be made between counsel and client, and their communi-
cations thus made, involving the necessary and useful intervention of
others, may be equally protected." The court also adopted the view
that the privilege may be asserted by those persons present who are
not actually represented by the attorney. The Maine case of Wade v.
Ridley4 was cited with approval. Here the Maine court asserted that
statements of fact made in good faith to an attorney at law for the
purpose of obtaining his professional guidance or opinion are privileged
communications, and that it is "not necessary that the relation of
attorney and client should exist."
The principal case seems consistent with these previous adjudica-
tions. At the conference, the prosecuting witness, accompanied by
counsel, was an interested party as to matters considered by the de-
fendant and his attorney. Applying the rules of the Hartness case
suggests the conclusion that the privilege could be asserted, as against
third persons, by either party. It seems consistent with the logic of
the principal that the additional fact that each party was accompanied
by separate counsel should not alter the confidential relationship.42
That a third party cannot claim the privilege is settled both in reason
and in case law.43
Privileged Communications Between Spouses-Acts as Communi-
cations. In State v. Americk," the defendant was convicted of placing
40 21 Wash. 655, 59 Pac. 491 (1899).
4187 Me. 368, 32 Atl. 975 (1895).
42 It might be noted, however, that at least one jurisdiction has, under a similar fact
situation, apparently reached the opposite result. State v. Hodgdon, 89 Vt. 148, 94 Atl.
301 (1915), was an action charging the defendant and others with burglary. The
parties did not make a common defense, and were represented by separate counsel. At
the trial, the attorney for one defendant was permitted to cross-examine another
defendant, who took the stand as a witness, concerning a conversation among such
defendants, his lawyer, and the cross-examining counsel. This was held proper. "It
was not a communication between (the defendant) and his own counsel, nor between
(the defendant) and an attorney acting in his interests." Although the court did not
qualify its statement that the communications were not privileged, the case might well
be rationalized and distinguished on the basis of the rule that no privilege exists as
between the parties to the conference. Note 39 supra. By this rationale, the conversations
could be considered as privileged as to third persons.
43 Martin v. Shaen, 22 Wn.2d 505, 156 P.2d 681 (1945) ; State v. Dunkley, 85 Utah
546, 39 P.2d 1097 (1935), overruled on other grounds, State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332,
142 P.2d 178 (1943) ; State v. Madden, 161 Minn. 132, 201 N.W. 297 (1924) ; Cf.,
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2327 (3d ed. 1940).
44 42 Wn.2d 504, 256 P.2d 278 (1953).
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an explosive in a car so as to endanger his ex-wife and another. He
assigned as error the admission in evidence of the testimony of his
former wife as to beatings he had inflicted upon her during their mar-
riage. He contended that this evidence was not admissible because it
was a privileged communication under the purview of RCW 5.60.
060(1). The assignment of error was considered to be without merit.
"It is the general rule that the beating of one spouse by the other is
not induced by confidence incident to the marital relationship." 45
TxomAs J. BRENNAN
Patient-Physician Privilege-Waiver of Privilege to One Physician Constitutes
Waiver as to Other Physicians. In McUne v. Fuqua, 42 Wn.2d 65, 253 P.2d 632 (1953),
a personal injury action, the plaintiff introduced three physicians who testified to the
extent of his injuries. The plaintiff himself testified that his health was good prior to
the accident, and that he had not consulted a doctor "for years." Following a verdict
for the plaintiff, the defendant was granted a new trial on the issue of damages because
of newly discovered evidence consisting of a doctor who would testify that during four
years prior to the accident he treated the plaintiff a total of twenty times for various
ailments. The plaintiff contended that this evidence was privileged under RCW
5.60.060(4). The Supreme Court affirmed the order for a new trial, holding that a
waiver as to one physician is a waiver as to all other physicians. The court here
assumes the minority position. This is commendable in that it denies the trickery of
placing a physician with favorable testimony on the stand and suppressing available
adverse testimony of other physicians by a claim of privilege-a maneuver which
Professor Wigmore terms playing "fast and loose with medical testimony." 8 WIGMORE,
EvmENCE, § 2390 (3d ed. 1940). This case is the subject of a Note in 28 WAsH. L.
REv. 237 (1953).
Presumption of Due Care by Decedent. Hutton v. Martin, 41 Wn2d 780, 252 P.2d
581 (1953), destroyed the presumption of due care on the part of the decedent. How-
ever, a later case, Stnith v. Yamashita, 42 Wn.2d 490, 256 P.2d 281 (1953), questions
the force of this decision. See Comment, 29 WAsH. L. REv. 79 (1954).
Privilege Against Self-Incriminaton-Inferences from Refusal to Testify. It was
established in Ikeda v. Curtis, 143 Wash. Dec. 413, 261 P.2d 684 (1953), that when a
witness in a civil suit refuses to answer a question on the ground that the answer
might tend to incriminate him, such refusal cannot be used against him in subsequent
criminal proceedings, but the trier of facts in the civil case is entitled to draw infer-
ences from such refusal to testify. Noted, 27 TEMP. L. Q. 366 (1954).
Privileged Communications Between Spouses-Statements Overheard by Third
Party. In State v. Thorne, 143 Wash. Dec. 43, 260 P.2d 331 (1953), the court held
that where a communication between spouses is heard by a third party, even if by
eaves-dropping, the third party may testify to it if the testimony is otherwise admissible.
45 That the testimony related to other crimes did not affect its admissibility, since
the rule excluding* such evidence is subject to the exception that such evidence may be
admitted to show motive, intent, absence of accident or mistake, a common scheme or
plan, or identity. See State v. Goebel, 36 Wn.2d 367, 218 P.2d 300 (1950) ; 40 Wn.2d 18,
240 P.2d 251 (1952). State v. Robbins, 35 Wn.2d 389, 213 P.2d 310 (1950), extended the
confidential communication privilege to include acts, though no attempt was made to
distinguish between those acts which are communications and those which are not. The
case is noted in 26 WASH. L. REv. 64 (1951)
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